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Abstract   Hazard analysis of dams arranged in complex or in cascade may involve the 
assessment of a large number of different scenarios of combined failures. However, a tremendous 
computation time would be needed to perform a detailed modeling of the flows generated by all 
possible scenarios. Therefore, the present paper describes a rational methodology for analyzing the 
flows induced by the most relevant incidents occurring on a complex or in a cascade of dams and 
reservoirs. The methodology combines several hydrodynamic models, including the two-
dimensional flow solver WOLF 2D and a simplified lumped hydrodynamic model, to simulate 
(i) the flows induced on the dams complex, (ii) the potential breaching in cascade of other dams, as 
well as (iii) the propagation of the flood wave in the whole downstream valley. The application of 
the methodology to a practical case study involving a complex of five dams is also described. 
Key words  dam break, risk analysis, flow simulation, dam breaching, dams cascade 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
A complete risk analysis related to dams 
arranged in complex or in cascade may involve the 
assessment of a large number of different scenarios 
of combined failures and dysfunctions, especially if 
embankment dams are concerned (Marche et al. 
1997). Indeed, when any incident occurs on a 
complex of dams, possible failures in cascade must 
be considered. Consequently, risk analysis in such 
cases requires a holistic vision at the scale of the 
complex. However, a prohibitive computation time 
would be needed to simulate the flows generated by 
all possible scenarios. Therefore, the present paper 
describes a procedure for efficiently analyzing the 
most relevant flows induced by incidents occurring 
on a complex or in a cascade of dams and reservoirs. 
The proposed methodology includes four steps, 
from the identification of the relevant individual 
failure scenarios to the computation of the hydraulic 
impacts on the reservoirs, on dams located 
downstream (with possible overtopping and/or 
failure in cascade) as well as in the downstream 
valley. At each stage, guidelines are provided to 
select the most appropriate modeling tool to 
compute accurately the induced flow at a reasonable 
CPU cost. The procedure typically combines two 
complementary flow models: first, the two-
dimensional flow solver WOLF 2D and, second, a 
simplified lumped model, requiring very low 
computation time (Dewals et al. 2007b).  
Finally, the paper describes the application of 
the model to a practical case study involving a 
complex of five dams. 
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2 ANALYSIS OF DAMS 
COMPLEXES OR CASCADES 
The proposed four-step methodology for 
analyzing a complex or a cascade of dams is 
summarized by the flow chart displayed in Figure 1. 
The method basically relies on a twofold approach 
to evaluate the impact in the downstream valley of 
failures on a complex (Marche 2004): 
• first the hydrographs potentially released 
immediately downstream of the complex are 
determined for all possible individual failure 
scenarios (step 1 and step 2) and considering 
possible failures in cascade (step 3); 
• second, the inundation in the downstream 
valley (step 4) is only simulated for some 
selected hydrographs released downstream. 
Step 1 Identification of individual failures 
Step 1 consists in identifying all the possible 
individual failure scenarios. Therefore, each dam or 
structure is reviewed and, by means of expert 
judgment and consultation with the dam owner, the 
possible malfunction or failure mechanisms are 
defined in accordance with ICOLD’s guidelines. 
Step 2 Hydraulic impact on the complex 
Step 2 involves the computation of induced 
flows on the complex or cascade of dams, while the 
hydraulic impact in the downstream valley is only 
considered at step 4. Step 2 must be executed with 
the most appropriate hydrodynamic modeling 
approach, depending on the type of flow induced on 
the complex of dams. As detailed by Dewals et al. 
(2007b), a 2D dynamic modeling approach is 
required for rapidly varying flows involving the 
propagation of stiff fronts, while a simpler lumped 
model may be applied if flow characteristics vary 
gradually. In some specific geometrical 
configurations (long and narrow reservoir), 1D 
modeling may also provide a suitable compromise. 
Step 3 Impact on downstream dams 
On the basis of these first hydrodynamic 
results, the hydrodynamic load on the dams and 
structures located downstream is characterized and 
subsequently the behavior of those structures can be 
deduced. If the structure downstream is expected to 
sustain the overtopping flow and provided that the 
flow variations remain sufficiently gradual, the 
lumped hydrodynamic model is used to compute 
directly the hydrograph released downstream. For 
more complex hydrodynamic conditions, the 
lumped model is replaced by its 1D or 2D 
counterpart. If the structure downstream fails or is 
breached as a result of extreme overtopping flow, 
the prediction of the flow released downstream may 
only be undertaken by a single computation 
simulating the flows upstream in the reservoir, 
through the breach and in the downstream valley. In 
this case, steps 2, 3 and 4 of the methodology merge 
into one unified simulation. Therefore, the breach 
parameters, such as final width and formation time, 
must be characterized. Due to the significant 
uncertainty affecting those parameters, performing a 
sensitivity analysis is extremely useful at this stage 
(Dewals et al. 2007a). After proper calibration, the 
lumped model represents an efficient flow solver to 
carry out such sensitivity analysis (Dewals 2006a). 
Step 4 Hydraulic impact in the valley 
Finally, the flow in the downstream valley is 
simulated by means of the 2D model. As mentioned 
above, this final simulation covers either the 
downstream valley only, if the crest of the most 
downstream structure of the complex remains a 
control section; or the upstream reservoirs and the 
downstream valley, if no control section remains as 
a result of failure of the most downstream dam. 
Besides, approximating the downstream flow 
by a steady state approach may be valid for 
particularly long duration released flow. 
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Fig. 1   Flow chart describing the methodology for analyzis of dam complexes. 
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3 APPLICATION: HAZARD 
ANALYSIS OF A COMPLEX 
OF FIVE DAMS 
As a case study, the methodology described 
above has been applied in the framework of a 
complete risk analysis process of an important 
complex of five dams. The main one (dam n°1), a 
50 m-high concrete dam, is located upstream of a 
complex of four other dams, including a 20-meter 
high rockfill embankment (dam n°2, located most 
downstream). Figure 2 illustrates the global 
configuration of the complex. 
As a consequence of this layout, the 
hypothetical failure of any of the upstream dams 
(particularly dam n°1) is very likely to induce other 
dam breaks in cascade (Dewals 2006b). Therefore 
the risk analysis of the complex must definitely be 
performed globally and not simply for each dam 
individually. 
In the following paragraphs, the analysis of the 
three following individual failure scenarios is 
briefly described in accordance with the overall 
procedure depicted in Figure 1: 
• scenario 1: collapse of the spillway of dam n°2; 
• scenario 2: failure of penstocks at dam n°1; 
• scenario 3: total collapse of dam n°1. 
For each scenario, Table 1 summarizes the 
main steps of the analysis, details the space and 
time discretization and states the type of coupling 
considered between the flows in the reservoirs and 
in the downstream valley. 
 
Fig. 2   Global layout of the complex of five dams. 
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4.1 SCENARIO 1: COLLAPSE OF THE 
SPILLWAY OF DAM N°2 
In scenario 1, the concrete spillway of the most 
downstream rockfill dam is assumed to collapse 
instantaneously. There is obviously no impact on 
other structures or dams of the complex and step 3 
of the methodology may be skipped, while steps 2 
and 4 merge into one 2D dynamic modeling, 
coupling the simulation of the flow in the lower 
reservoir and in the downstream valley. 
4.2 SCENARIO 2: FAILURE OF 
PENSTOCKS AT DAM N°1 
According to scenario 2, penstocks are 
assumed to break down between dam n°1 and the 
hydroelectric power plant located at its toe. Such a 
failure may result from material or weld defect, or 
from sabotage. 
Since the discharge released from the upper 
reservoir into the lower reservoir leads to relatively 
gradual flow motions in the reservoirs, the lumped 
hydrodynamic model is exploited for step 2 of the 
methodology. Hence, the simulations are based on 
two coupled equations governing the evolution of 
the free surface of the two main reservoirs (Dewals 
2006a; Dewals et al. 2007b). As a result, the 
hydrographs of the flows overtopping each of the 
downstream dams (n°2 to 5) are obtained. They 
enable to deduce that those downstream dams are 
very unlikely to fail in cascade (step 3). Finally, the 
hydraulic impact in the downstream valley is 
computed by means of a 2D simulation covering 
only the downstream valley, since the crest of the 
most downstream dam (dam n°2) remains a control 
section resulting in a decoupling of the flows 
upstream and downstream of dam n°2. Besides, as a 
result of the relatively smooth hydrograph released, 
the approximation of a steady flow in the valley has 
been shown to be valid. 
4.3 SCENARIO 3: TOTAL COLLAPSE 
OF DAM N°1 
In accordance with ICOLD’s recommendations, 
the failure dynamics of the total collapse of dam n°1 
is expected to be instantaneous (ICOLD 1998). 
By means of a 2D hydrodynamic modeling, 
involving over 400,000 computation cells, the 
detailed propagation of the waves induced on the 
lower reservoir has been simulated. This 
computation provides the characteristics of the 
overtopping waves reaching the downstream dams 
and reveals dramatic hydrodynamic loads acting on 
them (Dewals 2006b). 
For the concrete dams (n°3 and n°4), the 
evaluation of the resultant forces and moments they 
undergo confirms that they are most likely to fail. 
Therefore, by means of a time-dependant 
topography implemented in the final simulation 
(step 4), dams n°3 and n°4 have been progressively 
removed from the topography once the computation 
detects that they are overtopped, hence representing 
their collapse in cascade triggered by the 
hydrodynamic waves reaching them (Dewals et al. 
2004; Dewals 2006b). On the contrary, embankment 
dam n°5 is supposed not to be breached considering 
that the hydrodynamic loads are significantly 
weaker than for dams n°3 and n°4. As regards the 
downstream rockfill dam (dam n°2), it is expected 
to be breached by the overtopping flow and the 
proper breach parameters have been estimated on 
the basis of several empirical formulae (Dewals et 
al. 2004) and physical modeling (Dupont et al.). 
The breaching mechanism is also introduced in the 
2D flow simulation by means of a time-dependant 
topography: once the computation code detects the 
overtopping, it triggers a time evolution of the local 
bed elevation in the topography matrix, according 
to the breach parameters previously defined, 
representing a very realistic breaching mechanism. 
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Since significant uncertainties remain 
regarding the breach parameters, an extensive 
sensitivity analysis has been carried out (based on 
the lumped hydrodynamic model) and demonstrates 
in particular that the sensitivity of the released 
hydrograph with respect to the breach formation 
time remains extremely weak, as a result of the 
large amount of water stored in the reservoirs 
(Dewals 2006a; Dewals et al. 2007a). 
Finally, a global transient 2D simulation has 
been carried out, coupling the flows in the 
reservoirs and in the whole downstream valley. The 
simulation mesh is based on a grid of about 
900,000 potential computation cells. The obtained 
results enable to plot essential hazard maps as well 
as hydrographs and limnigraphs at a number of 
strategic points downstream of the dams (urbanized 
areas, bridges, …), which constitute the key input 
for the subsequent stages of the risk analysis 
process. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, based on both theoretical 
developments and numerical studies, the present 
paper provides an overview of new advances of 
practical relevance for dam break risk analysis. 
Indeed, the global methodology developed 
addresses the main issues related to the analysis of 
failures and malfunctions on a complex or cascade 
of dams, such as dealing with possible (gradual) 
failures induced in cascade, combining efficiently 
several hydrodynamic modeling tools (incl. 2D 
dynamic model and lumped model), or conducting 
relevant sensitivity analysis. 
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